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Abstract
In a seminal paper, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) use an undirected network to
characterize knowledge ows between rms engaging in research in an oligopolistic market.
In their paper, rms are regarded as inhabiting a research joint venture (RJV), if they
share the same edge of the network. These rms are allowed an R&D spillover of 1; the
outside rms (rms not sharing an edge in the network) are permitted a constant knowledge
spillover that is less than one. We begin our paper by showing that this last assumption
has important consequences when dealing with R&D networks of size greater than or equal
to six rms. We present examples of topologically non-equivalent networks that have the
same degree of connectivity and generate identical outcomes in terms of R&D eort, rm
prots and total welfare. We then modify their model so that R&D spillovers decrease
as the number of shortest paths increases between any two rms. We show that under
product dierentiated Cournot and Bertrand competition, we have dierent outcomes for
all economic variables. We also show that R&D eort increases with respect to the number
of collaborative links if rms are in a weakly competitive market, whereas it declines if rms
are in a more competitive market where products are closer substitutes. We also nd that
in more competitive markets there is a conict between the stability and the eciency of
RJVs.
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11 Introduction
There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature in industrial organization focusing on the
incentives for and welfare implications from innovation stemming from the seminal paper by
Arrow (1962).1 Among the theoretical models used in this literature, one important sub-family
are the class of models due to D'Aspremont and Jacquemien (1988, 1990) and Kamien, Muller
and Zang (1992).2 These models present a situation in which there is a possibility that rms can
free-ride o the knowledge generated as a by-product of the research and development (R&D)
activities of competing rms in the same industry. As such the money invested in cost-saving
process innovation is far below the level that is socially optimal. The solution presented in these
papers was for rms to share knowledge generated from R&D and/or coordinate their costs of
investment. One of the criticisms of these models has been the way in which these knowledge
spillovers are bundled into costs. This has lead to a growing literature that has focused on
augmenting the models of D'Aspremont and Jacquemien and Kamien, Muller and Zang in
order to unbundle the \black box" of knowledge spillovers and better understand how these
spillovers lead to gains in terms of the tangible outcomes of prot and welfare gains.3
One approach for doing this was set down in an important paper by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez
(2001), which extended the D'Aspremont and Jacquemien model to incorporate an undirected
network as a means of characterizing knowledge ows between rms networked into a research
joint venture (RJV).4 In that paper, they model an R&D network for a market in which rms
selling a homogeneous good engage in Cournot competition. Our paper provides an extension
of this model. We argue that the denition of R&D eective eort that was used in their paper
is not sucient when the number of rms increases to six and beyond. We present examples
of pairs of topologically non-equivalent R&D networks for a product dierentiated Cournot
oligopoly with six rms. We show that when Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) is applied to
each of the examples, we obtain identical outcomes in terms of R&D eort, rm prots and
total welfare for each of the non-equivalent R&D networks. We show that this changes when
we modify the way that R&D spillover term is dened, so that it depends directly on the size
of the R&D network and how rms are placed within this network in relation to the placement
of other rms.
Specically, in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) this spillover term is a constant, which is
set exogenously and is identical for all rms not directly engaged in a RJV with any one rm
1An excellent summary of this literature can be found in De Bondt (1996).
2Other important papers in this literature include Leahy and Neary (1997), Petit and Tolwinski (1999),
Poyago-Theotoky, (1995), Spence (1984) and Suzumura (1984).
3Important papers include those by Amir and Wooders (1999), Bloch (1995), Kultti and Takalo (1998), Legros
and Matsushima (1991), Legros and Mathews (1993), Long and Soubeyran (1999), Martin (1994), Salant and
Shaeer (1998, 1999), Veugelers and Kasteloot (1996).
4Other papers in this literature on R&D networks, with a slightly narrower focus concentrating on formation
of RJVs, include Goyal and Joshi (2003), Yi (1998) and Yi and Shin (2000).
1placed with the R&D network. Hence, the size of a rms eective R&D eort increases with the
number of direct collaborative connections. By comparison, in our model, knowledge spillovers
to any one rm increases with the number of its cooperative links, as well as the number of
shortest paths between this rm and others that are not directed linked to it. In this way, as
the length of the shortest path increases between this rm and other rms, then the marginal
gain in eective R&D will decline. By applying our new model to the non-equivalent network
examples, we show dierent outcomes for all economic variables.
The second point of departure between our paper and Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) is
that they study both symmetric and asymmetric R&D networks, considering only the case
where rms are Cournot oligopolists producing a homogeneous good. In the rst case, sym-
metric (or regular) networks means that each rm has the same number of links (neighbors).
In the second case, asymmetric networks, rms have dierent numbers of links. Their most
general results, for the case of n rms, focus exclusively on symmetric networks. They only
consider asymmetric networks when there are three rms present in the market. The main
nding in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), in the case of symmetric networks, is that al-
though the complete R&D network is stable (in which all rms are engaged in a single RJV),
there exist intermediate levels of collaboration that are more ecient. They also nd that this
result also holds for asymmetric R&D networks of size three.
By contrast, we will concentrate only on asymmetric R&D networks and apply our new model
to examine the impact of Cournot and Bertrand competition under the assumption of product
dierentiation. This will allow us to examine the impact of market structure on the R&D eort
generated from this underlying network. For both types of competition, Bertrand and Cournot,
we examine the impact of dierent R&D networks for the case where there are three and six
rms, allowing for the possibility of asymmetric networks. The most signicant results are
that the eort of rms in R&D increases with respect to the collaborative links if rms are in
weakly competitive markets, whereas it declines if rms are in a more competitive market (as
characterized by the degree of substitutability between products). Likewise, the R&D eort of
neighbors of cooperative rms (i.e. rms not directly participating in a RJV) is also similarly
aected.
The conict between the stability and eciency of networks reported in Goyal and Moraga-
Gonazles (2001) sometimes appears, but not always. We nd that the complete network is
the unique stable network as well as the unique ecient network if rms are not in a strongly
competitive market for R&D networks consisting of three rms. By contrast, for R&D networks
composed of six rms, we nd that the complete network is the unique stable network as
well as the unique ecient network if rms are in a weakly competitive market. However,
in more competitive markets (where goods are close substitutes), there is always a trade-o
between stability and eciency as the network becomes more connected, which is consistent
with results in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). This suggests that product dierentiation
and type of competition exhibited between rms have an impact on the stability and eciency
2of RJVs.
This paper is organized as a follows. In the second section we introduce the model of Goyal and
Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). We explain a problem with this model by giving some examples of
non-equivalent networks of six rms, where in each network rms have same degree distribution.
We show that when this is the case the R&D network will produce identical outcomes in terms
of R&D eort, rm prots and total welfare for each of the non-equivalent R&D networks. In
the third section of this paper, we introduce our model for R&D networks consisting of three
rms and four distinct network topologies and are able to provide a complete characterization
of the impact of market structure on the R&D network. In sections four and ve, we study
the impact of this R&D network for the case where there are three and six rms, respectively.
Unfortunately, when there are six rms there are too many R&D networks to provide a complete
characterization. Hence, in section ve, we concentrate will on the most signicant networks in
these two section. In the last section we conclude our work by summarizing the most important
aspects of the R&D network model presented in this paper.
2 Motivation
In this section we introduce the R&D network model in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001).
In this model there are n rms competing as Cournot oligopolists, with each rm selling an
homogeneous good and engaging in cost reducing R&D. (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001)
assume a linear demand equation for this market). As in the standard R&D spillovers model
rms choose with whom they wish to collaborate (which determines the R&D network topology
and the R&D spillover levels accruing to each rm), each rm i then chooses their level of
cost reducing R&D eort xi, which in turn inuences their output quantity qi: The costs
associated with R&D eort are quadratic x2
i, where  > 0 indicates the eectiveness of R&D
expenditure.
In Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) the eective R&D eort for each rm is described by
the following equation






xk; i = 1;:::;n; (1)
where xi denotes R&D eort of rm i, Ni is the set of rms participating in a joint venture with
rm i and  2 [0;1) is an exogenous parameter that captures knowledge spillovers acquired
from rms not engaged in a joint venture with rm i. The eective R&D eort is cost reducing
in the sense that it reduces rm i's marginal cost of production:






xk; i = 1;:::;n; (2)
3where  c is the marginal cost of production unadjusted for R&D eort. One can see that
eective R&D eort (and marginal cost of production) will increase (decrease) as the degree of
connectivity in the R&D network increases.
We will now show that this creates a problem when the number of rms n  6. We will do
this by comparing topologically non-equivalent networks with identical degree connectivity. We
will show that, when this is the case, these two R&D networks will be identical in terms of the
R&D eort, prot and welfare they generated. The reason this does not occur when n = 3 or
n = 4 is that there are no non-equivalent networks that have the same degree distribution. We
were unable to verify whether this was the case for n = 5, as there are too many non-equivalent
networks.5
We now present two examples for the case where there are six possible rms. In these two
examples we show that by using the approach in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) for com-
puting eective R&D eort, we generate identical outcomes for pairs of non-equivalent R&D
networks.
Example 1 (R&D Networks of Degree Distribution 2) Consider the following two R&D
networks, G4 and G5.6 (Shown in Figure 1). In term of economics, the two networks should
lead to dierent outcomes: Network G4 models two competing RJVs (Kamien and Zang (1993)),
while G5 models a situation where there are overlapping RJVs.
Figure 1: Two non-equivalent networks G4 and G5 with the same degree distribution.
From the perspective of network theory, each network has six nodes and six links. Within each
network, each node has two links, which implies that each node has the same degree. Hence G4
5The number of non-equivalent networks for n = 3, 4 and 5 are 4, 11 and 34. Hence at n = 5 there are too
many networks to able to explore the full range of possible collaborative structures. Note that when n = 6, there
will be 156 non-equivalent networks.
6Regarding the notation we use in Examples 1 and 2, the reader should consult Figure 10. Gn is a placeholder
used to denote one of the networks listed in this gure.
4Figure 2: R&D eort, prots and total welfare for networks G4 and G5,  = 0:3.
5and G5 have the same degree distribution. However, the networks are non-equivalent from the
perspective of network theory as G4 has two cycles and G5 has one cycle. Figures 2 shows plots
that show aggregate R&D eort, rm level prots and total welfare are identical for networks
G4 and G5
In the next example, we will compare two networks which are non-equivalent and topologically
more complex than networks G4 and G5.
Example 2 (R&D networks with six rms and degree distribution three) Consider the
following two R&D networks. The rst network is called G11 and the second is G12. (See Figure
3).
Figure 3: Two non-equivalent networks G11 and G12 with identical degree and more complex
structure.
Both networks have same degree distribution where all rms are of degree three. The two
networks are not equivalent because the second network, G12, has two cycles of length three,
whereas G11 network, which has multiple cycles, has no one cycles of length three. The following
three outcomes can be observed (see Figure 4): R&D eort, total prot of rms and total welfare
are identical. This is because the degree distribution of these two networks is the same, even
though the network topologies dier greatly in all other aspects.
3 The Model
In Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales (2001), eective eort for each rm depends on the number of
direct links that rm has to other rms in the network (i.e., its degree of connectivity). If the
number of these direct links increases, then its eective R&D eort will grow. However, the
degree connectivity can be quite misleading in some situations and because of that we use an
idea of shortest path. To overcome this problem, we will make the size of spillover dependent on
6Figure 4: R&D eort, prots and total welfare for networks G11 and G12,  = 0:3.
7distance between any two rms, where we will model distance in the graph theoretic sense (i.e.,
in terms of the number of hops or links between any two rms (nodes) in the R&D network)
(Jackson 2008; Newman 2003). We do this so that knowledge spillovers will be increasing as
the relative distance between any two rms in the network decreases. In this way knowledge
spillovers will be highest between any two rms when they share the same edge of the network.
Since there may be many potential shortest paths between any two rms located in the R&D
network, the distance between these two rms will be characterized in terms of the shortest
path between them.
In this way the eective R&D eort applied by any one rm can be characterized by the
following equation:











; i = 1;:::;n: (4)
Here mil is number of shortest paths between rms i and j, Cd(i) = deg(i)=(n 1) is the degree
centrality of the rm i , where deg(i) denotes the degree of node i (i.e., the number links that
connect to that node) and Lil is length of the shortest path (i.e. smallest number of steps or
jumps) between rms i and j. Thus Tij (equation (4)) measures the fall in graph theoretic
distance.
We note that Tij has the following properties:
1. The fraction Tij takes its highest value when mij = n   2, Cd(i) = n 2
n 1 and Lij = 2,
where then Tij =
(n 2)2
2(n 1).
2. The fraction Tij takes its lowest value when mij = 1, Cd(i) = 1
n 1 and Lij = n 1 where
then Tij = 1
(n 1)2.
3. When the fraction Tij is more than one (Tij > 1), we assume that the spillover between
rms i and j is not restricted  2 [0;1).
4. In disconnected networks, we need to ensure low knowledge spillover between non-connected
rms by assuming Tij = 1
n(n 1) between non-connected rms.
5. We assume Tij = 1
n2 in the empty network to make the knowledge spillover lower in the
empty network smaller than in disconnected networks.
Our analysis diers from that of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales (2001) in the sense that we assume
rms sell dierentiated products. Hence we assume that the utility function of consumers is


















Here the demand parameters a > 0 denotes the consumers' willingness to pay and  > 0 is the
diminishing marginal rate of consumption, while qi is quantity consumed of good i. Without
loss of generality, we will assume  = 1 to simplify the analysis. The parameter  captures the
marginal rate of substitution between dierent products.
We use the utility function to nd the inverse demand function (D 1
i ) by calculating @U
@qi  pi = 0
where pi is the price of the rm producing good i. Then,
D 1
i = pi = a   qi   
X
j6=i
qj i = 1;:::;n; (6)
where qi is quantities of goods produced by rm i and  determines the degree of product
dierentiation. If  > (< 0), products are substitutes (complements) and if  = 0, products
are independent.
As in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales (2001), rms are assumed to be operating in the market
with the same constant marginal cost of production, c. R&D eort level Xi, which is dened
in equations (3) and (4), describes how much the marginal cost (c) of production is reduced
as a consequence direct R&D expenditure xi by rm i and knowledge spillovers generated
from other rms in the R&D network. Hence, the marginal cost of production for each rm i,
denoted by ci, is expressed as follows:
ci = c   Xi; i = 1;:::;n (7)
where c  Xi. Upon substituting equation (3) into equation (7), we see that the marginal cost
function for rm i takes the following formula






Tilxl; i = 1:::n (8)
The eort is assumed to be costly and the function of the cost is quadratic function. so that
the cost of R&D is x2
i, where  > 0 indicates the eectiveness of R&D expenditure. The
prot function for rm i is given by this formula
i =
0






i i = 1;:::;n (9)
























The sequence of play between competing rms in this model follows that of Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzales (2001) and proceeds as follows:
The rst stage: Each rm chooses its research partners. Firms collaborate by forming bilat-
eral (or pairwise) links between themselves and other rms. The rms and the cooperative
links together characterize a network of cooperation in R&D.
The second stage: Given the R&D network, each rm chooses the amounts of investment
(eorts) in R&D simultaneously and independently in order to reduce the cost of pro-
duction. The R&D eort across the network determines the eective R&D of each rm.
The third stage: Given the R&D investments of each rm and the eective R&D eort (as
determined by the R&D network), rms now compete in the product market by setting
quantities (Cournot competition) or prices (Bertrand Competition) in order to maximize
their prots.
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i i = 1;:::;n; (12)
where K i =
Pn
j6=i Tijxj denotes the eort of all of the other n 1 rms in the R&D network,
with the excluding rm i.




1 + (n   2)
1 + (n   2)   (n   1)2

(1   )((2(n   2) + 1) + 2)(a   c) + Y1xi + Y2K i
(2n   3)(n   3)2 + 6(n   2) + 4
 
((n   2) + 1)
hP











1 + (n   2)
1 + (n   2)   (n   1)2

(1   )((2(n   2) + 1) + 2)(a   c) + Y1xi + Y2K i
(2n   3)(n   3)2 + 6(n   2) + 4
 
((n   2) + 1)
hP
j6=i xj + 
P
j6=i K j ]





i; i = 1;:::;n; (14)
where Y1 = 2 + 3(n   2) + (n2   5n + 5)2   ((n   2) + 1)
Pn
j6=i Tji and Y2 = 2 + 3(n  
2) + (n2   5n + 5)2.
It can be seen that the equilibria and equilibrium prots under Cournot and Bertrand com-
petition depend on X i, the eective R&D eort of rm i's competitors. In our model, this
depends on the entire structure of the R&D network, not on the number of direct links as is the
case in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). As such, it is not possible to generalize our model
to the extent of the analysis constructed in Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) for symmetric
R&D networks and derive a general formula for equilibrium R&D eort and equilibrium out-
put and prices. However, we will apply our model to illustrate what eect of changes in R&D
network topology will have on oligopolies consisting of three and six rms under Cournot and
Bertrand competition with dierentiated products. This will be done in sections four and ve
of our paper.
To show that we obtain dierent results the reader should consult Figures 5. Figure 5 shows
a comparison of R&D eort, rm level prot and total welfare for networks G4 and G5 (left
side) and networks G11 and G12 (right side). For both pairs of R&D networks in Figures 5 we
assumed Cournot competition and used the same parameters, as were used in Examples 1 and
2 that generated Figures 2 and 4, respectively. The only dierence was in the way that the
spillovers were calculated for rms not directly involved in a RJV. Figures 2 and 4 of Example
1 and 2 were generated from the model of Goyal and Moraga-Gonzales (2001), while Figures 5
uses our model of R&D spillovers.
The reader will immediately that these results for R&D eort, rm level prot and total welfare
are dierent for the comparisons of networks G4 and G5 and G11 and G12. In fact we later
show in Sections 4 and 5, for R&D networks comprised of six rms. Furthermore, R&D eort
and prots among rms within each R&D network diers substantially. The only time that
11Figure 5: R&D eort rm prots and total welfare for the networks in Example 1 (left hand
side) and Example 2 (right hand side).
12networks generate symmetric equilibria (in which prices, output, R&D eort and prots are
identical) is when an R&D network is regular, i.e. when each node has the same number of
links or degree (Jackson 2009, Newman 2003).
4 Cournot competition with product dierentiation
In this section, we discuss the Cournot competition. First, we take the case of three rms and
then we assume that there are six rms in the market.
4.1 Three rms in the market
When there are three rms in the market, we will have four possible R&D networks. These
can be seen below in Figure 6. The network on the top left in Figure 6 is the complete network
(which we denote by K3), while the network on the bottom left is the empty network (denoted
by K3 or E3). The star network (S3), where the hub rm is denoted by h and the two spoke
rms are denoted by s is on to top right of Figure 6. The partial network (P3) where the linked
rms and the isolated rm denoted by ` and u, respectively, is on the bottom right of Figure
6.
Figure 6: The four distinct R&D networks for a market consisting of three rms.
In this market the inverse demand function for rm i is given by
pi = a   qi   (qj + qk); i;j;k = 1;2;3: (15)
13Then, the prot of the rm i is
i = (a   qi   (qj + qk)   ci)qi   x2
i; i;j;k = 1;2;3; (16)
where ci the marginal cost of production is dened as in equation (7). The equilibrium quantity
and prot derived for rm i in the product market stage game are derived as follows
q
i =
(2   )a   (2 + )ci + (cj + ck)






(2   )a   (2 + )ci + (cj + ck)
2(2 +    2)
2
  x2
i; i;j;k = 1;2;3: (18)
The subgame prefect equilibrium rm level R&D eort and quantities are provided below for
each of the four possible R&D networks.









2(1 + )(a   c)
4( + 1)2   3
(20)
2. The empty network:
x
e =
9(a   c)((2   9)   18)
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(a   c)( + 1)(   2)
(3243 + (81   972   42) + 36   648 + 162)
(22)




(a   c)(323   962 + (2   4)   8 + 128 + 32)
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(a   c)( + 1)(323   962 + (2   4)   8 + 128 + 32)





8(8   )(a   c)(2 +    2)





642(a   c)( + 1)2(   2)2
K1 + 2K2   3K3 + K4
(26)
where K1 = 42   2   16 + 4 + 10242, K2 = 42 + 1282 + 224, K3 = 32 +
16 + 6402, and K4 = 8   256   32 + 5122   12824 + 12825   32.
Figure 7: R&D eort as a function of degree of substitution () for individual rms with in
each of the four R&D networks




3(   12)(a   c)(363   1082 + (9   2   18)   6(6      24))





36(a   c)(2      2)(363   1082 + (9   2   18)   6(6      24))





6(a   c)(   3   6)(363   1082 + (6   ) + 12( + 12   6))





36(a   c)(2      2)(363   1082 + (6   ) + 12( + 12   6))
M1 + 2M2 + 3M3 + 4M4 + M5
(30)
where M1 = 362  183  3456 +648  311042 +12960  1296, M2 = 4  33 +
2162  362  2592 +108 +155522  3888, M3 = 1082 +1296 +285122  
1944, M4 = 432   1082   77762   648   648, and M5 = 259226 + 722  
777625   207362 + 15552   2592.
We now provide a numerical example for an R&D network consisting of three rms. We
assume that a = 120 and c = 100. R&D eort, prot of rms and total welfare are plotted in
the following gures. When  2 [ 0:4;1), we nd that  = 3 is sucient to obtain non-negative
results for all variables in all of the networks.7 Figure 7 plots rm level R&D eort against
the substitutability parameter . The rst thing to observe is that for all R&D networks,
there is a negative relationship between R&D eort of individual rms and  the degree of
substitutability between products, with the highest level of R&D conducted by rms selling
complementary products.
7Values of  must be large enough to nd non-negative results for all economic variables. For this to be
achieved in the case of the complete network and others are similar, the following two conditions must hold:
1. The eort of rms in the complete network must be non-negative which means that from equation (19),
we have  >
3
4(1+)2.
2. The cost function equation of K3 is given by c
 =
4(+1)2 c 3a
4(+1)2 3 , from this we have  >
3a
4(1+)2c.






16The second thing to note from Figure 7 is that, with the exception of the complete R&D
network, K3, the size of each rm R&D eort depends on their location within the R&D
network relative to other rms contained within this network. This is a direct consequence of
the R&D network being asymmetric and emerges because of the way in which R&D spillovers
are formulated in our model. A natural question to ask is what degree do the R&D investment
decision of one rm impact on other rms' investment decisions within the R&D network and
whether this is inuenced by the topology of the R&D network and rms' location within
it?
Figure 8 shows that, for our numerical example, when rms sell either complementary or in-
dependent goods (i.e, when   0), an increase in R&D investment by any rm will always
lead to other rms' raising their R&D eorts (@xi=@xj > 0 for all rms i and j). This rela-
tionship holds for all R&D networks. When  > 0 and small and the spillover  is high, then
for the empty network  K3, the star network S3 and the partial network P3 we also nd that
@xi=@xj > 0 for all rms i and j. However, for other values of  and , the R&D investment
decisions of rms that are not linked will always have a negative impact on the R&D eort
other rms in the network.
Specically we nd for the star network S3 that spoke rms @xjs=@xks < 0 and for the partial
network P3 that @x`=@xu < 0). For the empty network K3 this negative relationship holds for
all rms. We nd that when rms are linked, so that are participating in a RJV with some or
all rms in the market, than for all  > 0, participating rms encourage each other to invest
in R&D eort. As a general rule,  is positive and not close to zero ( > 0:1), R&D eort of
rms declines with an increase in the number of collaborative links between rms. This would
be expected as R&D spillovers are higher when the number of connections increases across the
network.
As a consequence we can say that when goods are substitutes rms are more willing to free
ride o the R&D eort invested by other rms. However, we nd that the degree to which this
happens depends on the size of the spillover parameter . We nd that when the spillover 
increases in substitute goods (i.e.  > 0), the eorts of all rms declines (i.e., @xi=@ < 0).
This relationship holds for each of the three networks mentioned above8. Although the eect
of the R&D spillover is negative for substitute goods, it impacts positively for complementary
and independent goods (  0), where the incentive of rms to invest in R&D increases with
increasing the spillover (@xi=@ > 0 for each rm i).
Figure 9 shows that the prot of rms increase with respect to the number of the cooperative
links and that this holds for all values of  that makes the complete network stable network
(consistent with Goyal and Morga-Gonzales (2001)). When  < 0:1 the prots of rms in the
complete R&D network K3 dominate the prots earned by rms in all other networks. We
8Note that the R&D eort of rms in the complete network remains constant with increasing the spillover as
Xi = xi + xj + xk for all i;j;k.
17Figure 8: R&D eort of the four networks for  =  0:4;0;0:1;0:3;0:5;0:9, respectively.
18Figure 9: Prot of rms in the four networks for substitution degree  =  0:4;0;0:1;0:3;0:5;0:9,
respectively.
19Figure 10: Total welfare of rms in the four networks for substitution degree  =
 0:4;0;0:1;0:3;0:5;0:9, respectively.
20also nd that in this range of  that the spillover parameter  has a positive eect on prots.
For other values of  > 0:1 the hub rm, within the star network S3, has prots which are
the highest. This implies that for substitute goods rms prefer to have central position in the
R&D network since then the center (hub) rm can benet of accessing all information and gain
a higher prot. However, within this range of  we nd for the state network S3 that as the
spillover parameter  increases, the prots of the hub rm will decrease while the prots for
the spoke rm will increase. For all other networks and for all values of  > 0:1 we nd that
prots increase as  > 0.
The prots shown for the rms in the complete network K3 and the star network S3 suggest
that K3 may be unique stable network. For any R&D network to be stable it requires that the
following two conditions be satised:
1. For any two rms ij 2 G, i(G)  i(G   ij) and j(G)  j(G   ij)
2. For any two rms ij = 2 G, if i(G) < i(G + ij) then j(G) > j(G + ij)
Here we use G to denote a generic R&D network, where G   ij is the network resulting from
the network G after deleting the link ij and G + ij is the network resulting from the network
G after adding the link ij.
From this denition, we can say that the network G is stable if no rm can obtain higher prot
from deleting one of their links and no other two rms benet from adding a link between them
with one beneting strictly. We can see that the second condition of the stability of networks
is satised at once, since we can not add another link to the network K3. Therefore, let us see
the rst condition by removing the link between rms i and j.
We nd that i(K3)  i(K3  ij) and j(K3)  j(K3  ij) for all i and j. This is clear since
the prots of rms increase with growing the collaborative links and this means the complete
network is stable network. To see the uniqueness, let G 6= K3 to be a stable network. Then,
G is dierent from the complete network by at least one link between rm i and rm j i.e
ij. By adding this link, we have G + ij = K3 and then, we nd that i(K3) > i(G) and
j(K3) > j(G). This yields that the network G is not stable and the complete network K3 is
the unique stable network.
In terms of network eciency, Figure 10 shows that the size total welfare for each of the four
R&D networks depends on the . For complementary and independent goods (  0), the total
welfare grows as the number of cooperative links between rms increases, making the complete
network K3 the unique ecient network. For substitute goods, this is true if the substitution
degree is not high ( < 0:9). For   0:9, the star network S3 becomes the most ecient
network.
214.2 Six rms in the market
In previous part with three rms, it is simple to consider all dierent networks. With six
rms, it is not possible to do this. Therefore, we consider some signicant networks that could
represent the structure of the market in R&D. These are shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11: Some possible distinct networks that could generated from six rms.
In the following, we summarize the most important results for the case of dierentiated Cournot
oligopoly with six rms:
Eorts of rms in R&D:
Impact of the standard of the competition on the eort of rms:
The eort of rms in R&D in the complete network declines with increasing the strength of
the competition among rms. This is true for other networks in particular the expenditure of
rms on R&D is higher (lower) for less (more) competitive market if the spillover is high.
Impact of the collaborative links on the eort of rms:
1. If the quantities are strategic complements:
(a) The eort of rms increases with respect to the cooperative links or we can say the
eort of rms increases with degree of rms.
(b) Firms in more dense network invest the highest in R&D whereas rms in networks
with no cooperative links spend the lowest.
22Figure 12: Ecient networks among the list of studied R&D networks for six rms under
Cournot competition.
2. If the quantities are strategic substitutes:
(a) The eort of rms declines with growing the cooperative links.
(b) Firms in more dense network invest the lowest in R&D whereas rms in networks
with no collaborative links have the highest R&D eort.
The impact of collaborative rms on outside rms:
1. The R&D eort of neighbors of cooperative rms goes up with growing the collaborative
links if the quantities are strategic complements.
2. If quantities are strategic substitutes, the eort of neighbors of cooperative rms declines
with growing the collaborative links.
Results in pertaining to regular networks:
Firms in the regular networks such as in the complete network G1 and cycle network G5 lead
to symmetric equilibria among rms, so output, prices, R&D eort and prots are identical for
all rms at the sub game perfect equilibrium. This is because regular networks have identical
degree for all nodes. As regular networks symmetric this implies for both Goyal and Moraga-
Gonzales (2001) and our paper, the R&D eort will be identical across all rms with a given
R&D network at the equilibrium.
Stability of networks:
The more dense network i.e the complete network (K6) is the unique stable network for all
23dierentiated goods.
Eciency of networks: (See Figure 12)
1. If the quantities are strategic complements, the dense network i.e the complete network
is the ecient network.
2. If the quantities are strategic substitutes in Cournot competition, the ecient network
diers with respect to values of the substitution degree and the spillover as a following:
(a) If the substitution degree is small, the dense network is the ecient network
(b) If the substitution degree is moderate (eg.  = 0:5) and the spillover is small
(  0:1), then G6 is ecient. For other values of the spillover network G8 is the
ecient.
(c) If the substitution degree is high (eg.  = 0:7) and spillover is not large (  0:5),
then network G8 is ecient. For other values of the spillover, network G7 is ecient.
(d) If the substitution degree is very high (eg.  = 0:9) and the spillover is small
(  0:35), then G8 is ecient. For intermediate spillover levels (0:35 <  < 0:7)
G7 is ecient and for high spillovers G5 network is ecient.
5 Bertrand competition with product dierentiation
In this section, we discuss Bertrand competition. We begin by examining the case where the
size of the market is three rms and then we assume that there are six rms. The R&D networks
for the three and six rm models we are as given in Figures 6 and 11, respectively.
5.1 Three rms in the market
Firstly, the inverse demand function for each of the three rms i, j and k is given by
pi = a   qi   qj   qk; i;j;k = 1;2;3 (31)
This then yields the demand function for rm i
qi =
(1   )a   (1 + )pi + (pj + pk)
(1   )(2 + 1)
; i;j;k = 1;2;3: (32)
By substituting qi into the prot function for rm i, this yields the prot function for rm
i:
i = (pi   ci)

(1   )a   (1 + )pi + (pj + pk)
(1   )(2 + 1)

  x2
i; i;j;k = 1;2;3: (33)
24To nd the reaction function of the price for rms i, we calculate @i
@pi = 0 to get
pi =
(1   )a + (pj + pk) + (1 + )ci
2(1 + )
; i;j;k = 1;2;3 (34)
Note that, the second order condition of maximization yields  2(1 )(2+1)=(1+) < 0. This
condition is satised for substitute and independent goods ( > 0 and  = 0 respectively) and
for complement goods, this condition is satised if  >  0:5. From this, we let the substitution
parameter  2 [ 0:4;1).
Analogously, we can nd that for rms j and k and by substitution among the best response
functions, we have the equilibrium price for rm i
p
i =
(1   )(3 + 2)a + (1 + )( + 2)ci + ( + 1)(cj + ck)
2(3 + 2)
; i;j;k = 1;2;3: (35)
Upon substituting p
i into demand function, qi, and prot function, i, we arrive at the equi-




(1   )(2 + 1)









(1   )(2 + 1)






We now want to nd the sub game perfect equilibrium R&D eort and quantities for each of
the rms in the complete (K3), empty (K3), star (S3) and partial (P3) R&D networks:
1. Complete network: The equilibrium R&D eort and output for each rm in the com-
plete network are given as follows:
x
k =
(1   2)(a   c)





2(a   c)(1 + )
4(2 + 1)   3(1   2)
: (39)












[162(3 + 2)(a   c)( + 1)]; (41)
where A = 648   36   162 + 2(1944 + 82   162) + (2268 + 42   72   405) +
3(42 + 36 + 81).
253. Star network: The optimal eort and output for the hub rm are given by
x
h =
((2   1)(a   c)(3(2 + 4   288   32) + 2(22   8   96)
B1 + 2B2 + 3B3 + 4B4 + 5B5 + B6
+
(64   20 + 256 + 2) + (128   8 + 32)))





(2(a   c)( + 1)(3(2 + 4   288   32) + 2(22   8   96)
B1 + 2B2 + 3B3 + 4B4 + 5B5 + B6
+
(20   2   256   64) + (8   128   32)))
B1 + 2B2 + 3B3 + 4B4 + 5B5 + B6
(43)
The optimal eort and output for each spoke rms is given by
x
s =
(8(a   c)(3   22   33 + 2)((   8) + ( + 8)2   8))





(642(3 + 2)2(a   c)(   1)( + 1))
B1 + 2B2 + 3B3 + 4B4 + 5B5 + B6
(45)
where B1 = 2 42+80 20482 20+512+64, B2 = 22 122 16642 480 
32, B3 = 24 82 80+19202 1184 96, B4 = 42 22+32+8+23042+
96, B5 = 42  2 +64  4 +544 +32, and B6 = 32  8  5122 +256 +32
4. Partial network: The optimal eort and output for the linked rm is given by
x
` =
3( + 1)(a   c)((12   )   2(   2) + 12)((90   21   288 + 2)
R1 + 2R2 + 3R3 + 4R4 + 5R5 + 6R6 + R7
+
2(36   18 + 108 + 22) + 3(2   3 + 324   18) + (36   144   6)





36(3 + 2)(a   c)( + 1)(3(324   3 + 2   18) + 2(222   18 + 36 + 108)
R1 + 2R2 + 3R3 + 4R4 + 5R5 + 6R6 + R7
+
(2   21   288 + 90) + (36   144   6))
R1 + 2R2 + 3R3 + 4R4 + 5R5 + 6R6 + R7
: (47)
The optimal eort and output for the isolated rms is given by
x
u =
6( + 1)(a   c)((9   )   2( + 3) + 6)(3(2 + 6 + 324   72)
R1 + 2R2 + 3R3 + 4R4 + 5R5 + 6R6 + R7
+
2(22   12 + 108) + (2   30   288 + 144) + (72   144   12))





(36(3 + 2)(a   c)( + 1)(3(2 + 6 + 324   72)
R1 + 2R2 + 3R3 + 4R4 + 5R5 + 6R6 + R7
+
2(22   12 + 108) + (2   30   288 + 144) + (72   144   12)))
R1 + 2R2 + 3R3 + 4R4 + 5R5 + 6R6 + R7
(49)
where R1 = 3242   183   3456 + 648   1140482 + 75168   11664, R2 = 4  
753 + 2162 + 3962   16416 + 2700   1918082 + 110160   15552,R3 = 44  
1023 + 9722   1082 + 16200   26352   233282 + 3672   1296, R4 = 64  
363 + 16202   4682   13392 + 1296 + 2099522   65448 + 9072, R5 = 44 +
243 +11882  2162 +3888 +1399682  864  13608 +2592, R6 = 4 +153 +
3242 + 3888 + 17496   540   1296, and R7 = 722   207362 + 15552   2592.
In the following, we give a numerical example of three rms where we assume that a = 120
and c = 100, then, we plot the R&D eort, the prot of rms and the total welfare. For
this we found that  = 4 is sucient to obtain non-negative results for all variables. As in
dierentiated Cournot modeled examined earlier, we focus on three basic aspects related to the
eort of rms: R&D eort, prots and welfare.
Firstly we note Figure 13 show that there is a inverse in the relationship between the strength of
competition between rms (as characterized by the substitutability parameter ) and the R&D
eort of individual rms. In the complete network, we observe that the optimal R&D eort
for each rm declines as the degree of substitution, , increases. We also note that this result
also holds for the other three R&D and is true for all values of the R&D spillover . Hence, we
can say that the R&D eort of rms depends on the degree of the competition among them,
with R&D eort decreasing as products become perfect substitutes. For complementary goods
when the substitution degree diverges from zero, the R&D eorts of rms in the complete R&D
network is highest. This is also true for other R&D networks whenever the R&D spillovers are
high. However, when goods are highly substitutable rms spend the lowest amount on R&D.
This tells us that more R&D eort is expected to be between rms that produce complementary
products and this also coincides with our ndings with respect to Cournot competition.
Figure 14 shows the eect of investment of rms on each other and spillovers. In general the
R&D eort of each rm has positive eects on other rms' R&D eorts if rms selling either
complementary or independent goods. In this case the R&D eort of each rm encourages
other rms to spend more on R&D (i.e @xi=@xj > 0 for all rms i and j). In this case, the
R&D eort decision of each rm can be regarded called a strategic complement. Also, for
complementary and independent goods, an increase in the spillover  will raise the incentive of
rms to invest more in R&D (i.e @xi=@ > 0 for each rm i). If rms are producing products
that are substitutes, in the complete network rms encourage each other to invest more in
R&D. However this relationship changes in networks that are only partially connected, where
higher degrees of substitution degree lead to a negative relationship between R&D eort applied
27by inside and outside rms (i.e @xs=@xs < 0 and @x`=@xu < 0). We also nd that there is
a signicant impact of the spillover parameter  on incentive of rms in R&D, with higher 
leading to lower R&D eorts (i.e @xi=@ < 0).
Figure 14 also shows the inuence of collaborative links on the R&D eorts of rms. For
complementary and independent goods and for highly dierentiated substituted goods, the
R&D eorts of rms increase as the number of collaborative links in the network increase.
However, for substitute goods which are not highly dierentiated ( > 0:1), we nd that the
R&D eort of rms declines with the number of cooperative links. Moreover, the existence a
direct R&D collaborative link between any two rms will also impact on the R&D eorts of
third party rms. We nd that when any two rms create a direct link (i.e., form a RJV), then
the R&D eort of the third rm will increases if rms sell complement and independent goods.
However if rms sell goods that are substitutes, then the R&D eort of the third party rm
rms declines if the other two rms decide to form a direct collaborative link.
In terms of the prot of rms (see Figure 15) we nd that the prot of rms goes up as the size
of the RJV increases. This implies that the complete network, K3, will dominate all other R&D
networks in term of stability. We also observe that since rms prefer to make collaborative
links between each other when selling complementary and independent goods. However, when
goods are substitutes, they prefer to become the center of the network. In this way they can
access all information and gain higher prot. However, the structure of cooperation in the star
network, S3 is not stable because the spoke rms will always want to create a link between
themselves and other rms in order to raise their prots. This causes the hub rm's prots to
decline. We also nd that the size of rm level prots is inuenced by the size of the R&D
spillover . For complementary and independent goods, we nd that prots increase as the
spillover increases. For substitute goods this is true, except for the prot of the hub rm in
the star network S3. which declines as spillovers increase.
We observe in Figure 16 that total welfare increases as the number the collaborative links in
the R&D network increases and this is true for all goods, except for when the substitution
degree is high. The idea that can be extracted from here is that, except when good are perfect
substitutes, the complete network K3 is the ecient network. However, when the substitution
degree is high the star network S3 is the most ecient. Moreover we nd that when the degree
of substitution is close to one, the partial network is the most ecient. In addition, the size of
the R&D spillovers  impacts on the size of the total welfare generated by each R&D network.
For all dierentiated goods that are not highly substitute, total welfare increases with increases
in the spillovers . Whereas, if the substitution degree is high, the total welfare in the star
network declines.
28Figure 13: R&D eort of rms in the four networks under Bertrand competition declines with
respect to the product dierentiation.
29Figure 14: The R&D eort of rms in the four networks for  =  0:4;0;0:1;0:3;0:5;0:9 re-
spectively.
30Figure 15: Prot of rms in the four networks for  =  0:4;0;0:1;0:3;0:5;0:9 respectively.
31Figure 16: Total welfare in the four networks for  =  0:4;0;0:1;0:3;0:5;0:9 respectively.
325.2 Results for dierentiated Bertrand oligopoly with six rms
Here we summarize our results for asymmetric R&D networks containing six rms for Bertrand
competition. As the reader will note most of the results are quite similar to the three rm model
and are therefore summarized. The most dierent results relate to the eciency of dierent
R&D networks. This is due to the larger number of rms in this market giving rise to greater
variety of collaborative structures in this market.
R&D Eort:
Impact of the degree of substitutability on the R&D eort of rms
In the complete network, rms in very weak competitive market spend the highest amount on
R&D where the expenditure becomes the lowest in strong competitive market. This is true for
other networks as well as the eort of rms is the highest (lowest) for less (more) competitive
market if the value of the spillover is high.
Impact of the collaborative links on the R&D eort of rms
1. If prices are strategic substitutes:
(a) Then the R&D eort of rms increases with respect to the cooperative links or we
can say the eort of rms increases with degree of rms.
(b) Then for more dense R&D network, rms spend the higher amount on R&D
2. If prices are strategic complements:
(a) For independent goods, we have the same result when the prices are strategic sub-
stitutes.
(b) for substitute goods:
i. If the substitution degree is not close to zero ( > 0:1), then eort of rms
declines with growing the cooperative links.
ii. Firms in the dense network invest the lowest amount in R&D if the substitution
degree is not small.
Impact of two collaborative rms on eort of outside rms:
1. If prices are strategic complements, then the R&D eort of neighboring rms (i.e. out-
siders - those not participating directly in the RJV) increases as the number collaborative
links in the network grow.
2. If prices are strategic complements
(a) When goods are either independent, R&D eort of neighboring rms increases as
collaborative links in the network grow.
33Figure 17: Ecient networks among the list of studied R&D networks for six rms under
Bertrand competition.
(b) For substitute goods, the eort of neighboring rms declines as collaborative links
in the R&D network increase.
Results for regular networks:
In regular networks, at the sub-game perfect equilibrium all rms have the same output for all
economic variables.
Stability of networks:
The dense network i.e the complete network, K6, is the stable unique network for all substitution
degree
Eciency of networks: (See Figure 17)
1. If prices are strategic substitutes, then the complete network K6 is the ecient network
2. When prices are strategic complements:
(a) If the substitution degree is small ( < 0:2), then the complete network K6 is the
ecient network.
(b) If the substitution degree is moderate (eg.  = 0:5)
i. When the R&D spillover is not high, the G8 network is the ecient.
ii. For other values of the R&D spillover, the cycle network G7 is the ecient
network.
(c) If the substitution degree is high, but not close to one (eg.  = 0:7)
34i. When the R&D spillover is small, the networks G7 and G8 are the most e-
cient.
ii. for other values of the spillover the G5 is the ecient network.
(d) If the substitution degree is very high (or close to one eg.  = 0:9)
i. Then G5 is the ecient network if R&D spillover is not high.
ii. For other values of the R&D spillover, the network G13 is the ecient network.
6 Conclusion
In this section, we conclude our work by writing summary of our results. In studying the
prots of rms and total welfare, we found the following. For both strategic substitutes and
complements, we observed that rms prefer to make collaborative links with all rms in an
industry. This means that the complete network is the unique stable network. This result is
consistent with Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001). For total welfare, we found results dier
with the degree of the competition. If rms are not in a strongly competitive market, the
complete network is the unique ecient network whereas in strongly competitive market, the
star network becomes the ecient. This result diers with Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001),
since the complete and star networks never ecient whereas for the other two networks their
relative degree of eciency depends on the value of the spillover.
Our results are dierent, depending on strength of the competition among rms. Under Cournot
competition with three rms in the market, we found that there is more collaboration between
rms that sell complementary products. Also, rms spend the highest value on R&D when
they form the complete network if they are in weak competitive market. However, rms in the
complete network expend the lowest amount on R&D eort if the competition among rms
increases, i.e. rms' products become closer substitutes. By increasing the size of the market
to be six rms we found about similar results for eort and prot (stability) of rms. However,
in term of the eciency of networks, the complete network is the ecient network if rms are
in weakly competitive market, but by increasing the degree of the dierentiation, the ecient
network becomes a less connected network. This tell us that the conict between stability and
eciency does not occur in weakly competitive market.
Under Bertrand competition with three rms, we found similar results to Cournot with respect
to R&D eort and the prots of rms. However, in term of the eciency of the R&D network,
we found that the complete network is ecient if rms are not in more competitive market
where then the star and the partial network become ecient depending on the value of the
degree dierentiation. For six rms in the market, we found similar results with Cournot
with six rms in terms of the eort and prot of rms. However, in terms of the eciency of
35the R&D network, we found they with increasing the competition among rms, the ecient
networks becomes the less connected network.
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